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RECENT DECISIONS
Religion and Child Custody
In Gluckstern v. Gluckstern1 both parties to a separation action had lived at the
beginning of their marriage according to the
tenets of the Jewish faith, but five years
prior to the action, the plaintiff had embraced the Christian Science religion. A
decree of- separation was granted to the
plaintiff upon grounds of abandonment and
cruel and inhuman treatment. The two
older children, both over fourteen years of
age, were given the opportunity to select
the parent with whom they would reside,
and the custody of the youngest child was
awarded to the plaintiff upon the condition that she would have the child examined
monthly by a physician and would generally provide the child with necessary medical care.
In deciding the main issue of the case,
the custody of the youngest child, the
Court considered the religious education
of the child but was satisfied to decree custody without making any specific recommendation in this area. The Court indicated
that the question of the child's religious
education was a matter for the custodian
to decide and concluded:
Nor does the fact that awarding custody to
the plaintiff may result in the child's being
educated according to the tenets of the
Christian Science Church affect the right
which she would otherwise have to its
custody.!
158 N.Y.S. 2d 504 (Sup. Ct. 1956). The original
action was reported in 148 N.Y.S. 2d 391, modified, 2 A.D. 2d 744, 153 N.Y.S. 2d 184 (1st Dep't
1956).
158 N.Y.S. 2d 504, 508 (Sup. Ct. 1956).

An examination of the New York cases
dealing with guardianship proceedings will
make it evident that the courts, in this
analogous area, have not been as prone to
establish the religious rights of a child in
so perfunctory a manner. These courts have
often found it necessary to determine the
religion of a child and make guardianship
appointments according to their findings.
It is true that religious considerations are
not always controlling, especially where
temporal advantages will result for the
benefit of the child if other factors are allowed to rule; 3 but the courts have greatly
concerned themselves with the child's right
to a religious education regardless of the
other factors involved. That a child has a
natural and legal right that his religious
faith be preserved and protected by the
court was expressly stated in the Matter of
4

Santos.

The early New York courts, following
the common law of the Reformation period
in England,5 held that the father had the
sole right to determine the religion of his
children. In 1881, the Court of Appeals
held that a father's expressed desire that
his child be educated in the Catholic faith
was decisive even though a non-Catholic
petitioner for guardianship could give
greater material advantages to the child
' People ex rel. Woolston v. Woolston, 135 Misc.
320, 239 N.Y. Supp. 185 (Sup. Ct. 1929); Matter
of Mancini, 89 Misc. 83, 151 N.Y. Supp. 387
(Surr. Ct. 1915).
'278 App. Div. 373, 105 N.Y.S. 2d 716 (1st Dep't
1951). See also N.Y.C. DOM. REL. CT. ACT § 88

(4).
See Friedman, The ParentalRight to Control the
Religious Education of a Child, 29 HARV. L. REv.
485 (1915-16).

3
than the court appointed Catholic guardian.6 It was stated in a later case that a
father is a "priest and king in his own
household" and that a court is obliged by
law to defer to the father's demands in
regard to the religious education of his
children. 7 .

In 1909 a statutory enactment established that a woman, along with her husband, is a joint guardian of her children.8
Thus the common law was altered so that
at present, the parents, rather than the
father alone, have the right to determine
the religion of their children. 9 However, the
courts had already arrived at a similar conclusion for it had been earlier stated that
the freedom of religion is a right that does
not fully appertain to ihose who have not
yet reached majority or mature judgment,
and it is for the parents to lead their chil10
dren to a religion of their own choosing.
It may generally be stated, therefore, that

in guardianship proceedings the religious
belief of the child is submitted to judicial
determination when the-petitioner for guardianship or guardian is of a possible differing religious conviction. It then clearly
becomes the duty of the court to make a
determination of the child's religion and
the primary difficulty involved is the basis
SMatter of Marcellin, 24 Hun 207 (N.Y. 1881).
'In re Lamb's Estate, 139 N.Y. Supp. 685 (Surr.
Ct. 1912). See also Matter of McConnon, 60 Misc.
22, 112 N.Y. Supp. 590 (Surr. Ct. 1908); Matter
of Crickard, 52 Misc. 63, 102 N.Y. Supp. 440
(Surr. Ct. 1906); Matter of Jacquet, 40 Misc. 575,
82 N.Y. Supp. 986 (Surr. Ct. 1903).
'N.Y.

DoM. REL. LAW § 81.
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upon which the determination should be
made.
In this respect, it should be noted that
our secular courts are not competeht to
evaluate nor question the sincerity of the
religious convictions of those petitioning
for guardianship. It may be questioned
whether it is just to subordinate the best
interests of a child to the guardian's nominal
religious affiliations," but the American
concept of freedom of religion would condemn such evaluation by our secular
courts. However, one court has gone so far
as to indicate that the marriage of a Catholic outside the Church evidenced laxity in
conforming to religious regulation, and
such fact was considered in denying the
12
petitioner guardianship of a Catholic child.
Concerning the religion of the child,
the courts have generally narrowed the
basis of their determination to an objective
fact, such as formal acceptance into a
church or the expressed religious preference of the child himself. In a recent case,
a New York court held that mere association with members of a religion or attendance at religious services will not ipso facto
change a child's religion. An affirmative
act of acceptance into the church must be
13
evident to bring about membership.
In another recent case, two children who
had been under the custody of a Jewish social agency for four years were placed in
the custody of a Catholic institution when
evidence was introduced to the court showU

Huard, The Law of Adoption: Ancient and Mod-

ern, 9 VAND. L. REV. 743 (1956).

Note, Religion as a Factor in Adoption, Guardianship and Custody, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 376
(1954).

' Matter of Crickard, 52 Misc. 63, 102 N.Y. Supp.
440 (Surr. Ct. 1906). See also In re Lamb's Estate,
139 N.Y. Supp. 685 (Surr. Ct. 1912).

"0Matter of Jacquet, 40 Misc. 575, 82 N.Y. Supp.

" Matter of Glavas, 203 Misc. 590, 121 N.Y.S.
2d 12 (Doam. Rel. Ct. 1953).

'

986 (Surr. Ct. 1903).
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ing that the children had been baptized in
the Roman Catholic Church. 14 In an earlier
case, a child was determined to be Protestant as he had been baptized and enrolled
in the "cradle roll" of the Methodist Episcopal Church.15
The formal acceptance doctrine appears
to have been given less weight by the
courts in those cases wherein it has been
adjudged that the children themselves are
capable of making a decision as to their
religious preference. Of course there can
be no arbitrary rule by which a court may
determine that the child has attained the
maturity of judgment by which it can evaluate the comparative merits or meaning of
differing religious faiths, so that the facts
of each case must be decisive. The Court of
Appeals recently held that a twelve year old
was capable of such decision, but the dissenting opinion flatly stated a child of that
age has not reached such a degree of maturity that his preference should be binding
upon the court.1G The court in In the Matter of Mancini acquiesced to the expressed
desire of a fourteen year old and appointed
as guardian the person of her choice. However, the guardian being of a different religious faith from that of the child, the court
ordered the guardian to educate the child
7
in the religion of the child's baptism.'
1' Matter of Santos, 278 App. Div. 373, 105 N.Y.S.
2d 716 (1st Dep't 1951). For criticism of this
decision see 65 HARV. L. REV. 694 (1951-52);
PFEFFER, CHURCH, STATE AND FREEDOM 588

(1953).
'in
re Newman's Guardianship, 142 Misc. 617,
255 N.Y. Supp. 777 (Surr. Ct. 1932).
'Martin

v. Martin, 308 N.Y. 136, 123 N.E. 2d

812 (1954).

See also 1
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(Jan. 1955).
" 89 Misc. 83, 151 N.Y. Supp. 387 (Surr. Ct.
1915). Cf. People ex rel. Woolston v. Woolston,

The child's actual religious practices or
attendance at religious services has also
been a factor which the courts have considered. Although not determinative, evidence that a child was an altar boy in a
Roman Catholic Church was persuasive in
the court's determination that the child was
a Catholic. s It would appear therefore
that the courts have recognized that a
forced change of religion may result in the
unsettlement of the child's tranquility if
the religious education of the child has
progressed so that definite religious concepts have been impressed upon its mind
through teaching and daily practice.' 9
It is manifest, then, that in guardianship
proceedings the New York courts have not
been hesitant in determining the religious
status of the child. In awarding custody in
separation and divorce proceedings the
problems which the court faces may differ
from those presented in a petition for
guardianship. The court may be presented.
with issues of increasing complexity which
must be considered if the best interests of
the child are to prevail. It is nevertheless
submitted that the spiritual life of the
child is a factor which cannot be summarily
dismissed, whether the proceedings be for
guardianship or custody.
In the instant case, the Court may be
justly criticized for its failure to examine the
religious status of the child in awarding
custody. It may be seriously contended
135 Misc. 320, 239 N.Y. Supp. 185 (Sup. Ct.
1929).
S Matter

of McConnon, 60 Misc. 22, 112 N.Y.

Supp. 590 (Surr. Ct. 1908).
"Matter of Glavas, 203 Misc. 590, 121 N.Y.S.
2d 12 (Dom. Rel. Ct. 1953); cf. Sisson v. Sisson
156 Misc. 236, 281 N.Y. Supp. 559 (Sup. Ct.),
modified, 246 App. Div. 151, 285 N.Y. Supp. 41
(3d Dep't), rev'd 271 N.Y. 285, 2 N.E. 2d 660
(1936).

3
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that if the child is Jewish then the plaintiff could not rightfully change the religion
of the child without the consent of the
father. 2° It is submitted that if it had been
determined that the child was of the Jewish
faith, although the best interests of the
child might dictate that the mother be the
proper custodian, custody should have.
been awarded only upon the condition that
the child be educated according to the
teachings of the Jewish faith. There is authority for the issuance of such a conditional decree in both custodial2 ' and guardianship2 2 proceedings.

protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.
An incidence of such legislation, the Court
said, would be to "reduce the adult popu-

Obscenity Statutes

munity.

The Supreme Court of the United States
in the significant decisioh of Butler v.
Michigan' recently declared unconstitu-

case the Supreme Court for the first time
.ruled squarely in favor of affording constitutional protection to purveyors of literature attacked as obscene.8 That the freedom
of speech and freedom of press guarantees

lation . . . to reading only what is fit.for
children. 3

At common law, publication of obscene
literature was an indictable offense as a
breach of the peace. 4 One of the first "obscenity" statutes was Lord Campbell's Act
of 1857." In the United States, every state
but New Mexico has some sort of law
banning the sale of obscene books.0 Generally speaking, the purpose of such legislation is twofold - to protect the young and
to uphold the moral standards of a com7

.It is interesting to note that in the Butler

tional a Michigan "'obscenity" law2 that

prohibited the sale of any book "manifestly
-tending to the corruption of the morals of
youth." In reversing the conviction of a
bookseller who sold to a police officer a
book which the trial court found to have
a potentially deleterious influence upon
youth, the Court held that the statute
unduly restricted freedom of speech as
' Matter of Glavas, supra note 19, Ross v. Ross,

149 N.Y.S. 2d 585 (Sup. Ct. 1956).
Shearer v. Shearer, 73 N.Y.S. 2d 337 (Sup. Ct.

21

1947).
2

Matter of Mancini, 89 Misc. 83, 151 N.Y. Supp.

387 (Surr. Ct. 1915); In re Lamb's Estate, 139
N.Y. Supp. 685 (Surr. Ct. 1912).
'352 U.S. 380 (1957).
2

MICH. STAT. ANN. § 28.575 (1938).

The statute

reads in part: "Any person who shall ... sell,..
any book .. .containing obscene, immoral, lewd
or lascivious language ... tending to incite minors
to violent or depraved or immoral acts, manifestly
tending to the corruption of the morals of youth
...shall be guilty of a misdemeanor."

'Supra note 1, at 383.
'See e.g., Commonwealth v. Holmes, 17 Mass.
*336 (1821 ); Rex v. Wilkes, 4 Burr. 2527, 98 Eng.
Rep. 327 (1770).
"20 & 21 Vict. c. 83 (1857). This statute provided
for searches and seizures under which the police
might confiscate obscene literature. It is interesting to note that in defense of the law, Lord Camp-i
bell said: "The measure was intended to apply
exclusively to the works written for the single
purpose of corrupting the morals of youth . . ."
(emphasis added). Grant & Angoff, Massachusetts and Censorship, 10 B.U.L. REV. 36, 55
(1930).
' Lockhart & McClure, Literature, the Law of
Obscenity, and the Constitution, 38 MINN. L. REV.
295, 324 (1954). However, New Mexico expressly
confers upon municipalities the power to prohibit
the sale of obscene literature. N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 14-21-12 (1953).
7 Cf. Lockhart & McClure, supra note 6, at 374.
IId. at 352. However, it cannot be disputed that
freedom of expression is limited. Chaplinsky v.
New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
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in the First Amendment were applicable to
such literature had been claimed before the
Court only once previously, and in that case9
a conviction for publishing an obscene book
was affirmed by an equally divided court
without opinion. However, there had been
dicta by the Court upholding such protection.1° One effect of this aspect of the decision may be that there will be more sales of
questionable literature and consequently
more prosecutions on "obscenity" cases.'"
Such a result should aid in clarifying uncer2
tainties in this field.'
The particular importance of the case
under discussion, though, is that the opinion
pronounced upon one of the standards for
determining whether certain literature is to
be declared obscene, 1 ' viz., the influence
of the book on a portion of the reading audience. Prior cases had set up such guides
'Doubleday & Co. v. New York, 335 U.S. 848
(1948), affirming per curiam by an equally divided
court sub. nom. People v. Doubleday & Co., 297
N.Y. 687, 77 N.E. 2d 6, affirming mem., 272 App.
Div. 799, 71 N.Y.S. 2d 736 (1st Dep't 1947) (per
curiam).

'See

Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 510

(1948).
'Cf.

Lockhart & McClure, Literature, the Law

of Obscenity, and the Constitution, 38 MINN. L.
REV. 295, 390 n. 540 (1954).
'1 "The best that can be said of this entire subject
is that the courts have made a hopeless muddle
of it." Grant & Angoff, Massachusettsand Censorship, 10 B.U.L. REV. 147, 158 (1930).

'For an excellent article on the position of the
Church as to obscenity and its meaning, see Gardiner, Moral Principles Towards a Definition of
the Obscene, 20 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 560
(1955). In the courts, obscenity has most often
been defined as that which tends to excite lust or
lower sexual morality. See, e.g., People v. Berg,
241 App. Div. 543, 544-45, 272 N.Y. Supp. 586,
588 (2d Dep't 1934) (per curiam); People v.
London, 63 N.Y.S. 2d 227, 230 (N.Y. City Magis.

Ct. 1946).

as the effect upon: a) youth,' 4 b) the
normal adult, 15 c) the young and abnormal' 6 and d) the probable reader. 7
Many states had enacted statutes specifically designed to protect the young; the typical one, like Michigan's, spoke of books
that would manifestly tend to corrupt the
morals of youth.' s
A logical starting point for a review of
this aspect of the case would be the famous
Hicklin case. 19 In that far-reaching deci" See People v. Wendling, 258 N.Y. 451, 180 N.E.
169 (1932).
"See People v. Pesky, 230 App. Div. 200, 243
N.Y. Supp. 193 (lst Dep't 1930).
' See United States v. Bennett, 24 Fed. Cas. 1093,
No. 14,571 (S.D.N.Y. 1879). New Hampshire's
statute appears to have been drawn with an eye on
the young and abnormal, for it defines an obscene
book as one "whose main theme or a notable part
of which tends to impair, or to corrupt, or to
deprave the moral behavior of anyone viewing or
reading it" (emphasis added). N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 71:16 (1955).
" See Commonwealth v. Isenstadt, 318 Mass. 543,
62 N.E. 2d 840 (1945). Under this view, if a book
is advertised and distributed in such a way as to
reach those upon whom it is not likely to have
undesirable effects, it is not obscene; on the other
hand, if the book is so circulated as to reach those
upon whom it is likely to have undesirable effects,
it is obscene.
"At least 11 states have "obscenity" statutes simi-

lar to Michigan's. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 847.01 (Supp.
1955); IOWA CODE ANN. § 725.4 (1950); ME.
REV. STAT. C. 134, § 24 (1954); MASS.ANN.LAWS
c. 272, §'28 (1956); R.I. GEN. LAWS c. 610, § 13
(1938); S.C. CODE § 16-414 (1952); TEX. PEN.
CODE art. 526 (1952); UTAH CODE ANN.§ 76-39-1
(1953); VA. CODE § 18-113 (1950); VT. REV.
STAT. §

8490 (1947); W.

VA. CODE ANN. §

6066

(1955).
A noteworthy sidelight is that New York's statute
relating to immoral entertainment (PEN. CODE
§ 1140) contains the phrase "tend to the corruption
of the morals of youth" whereas the statute relating to obscene books (PEN. CODE § 1141) does
not.
"Queen v. Hicklin, L.R. 3 Q.B. 360 (1868). In
that case, the court declared obscene "The Con-

3
sion, Lord Chief Justice Cockburn held
that the test of obscenity was
whether the tendency of the matter charged
as obscenity is to deprave and corrupt those
whose minds are open to such immoral influences, and into whose hands a publication of
this sort may fall."

The English jurist added that the pamphlet
in issue "would suggest to the minds of
the young of either sex, or even to persons
of more advanced years, thoughts of a most
impure and libidinous character.

' 21

This

view became firmly imbedded in subsequent
cases not only in England but also in the
United States.

22

Within a half-century, war was declared
on the Hicklin rule. The most audible attack came in 1913 when Judge Learned
Hand, though surrendering to the traditionally-honored doctrine of stare decisis,
personally rejected that test and issued this
biting protest:
•.. [I]t seems hardly likely that we are even
to-day so lukewarm in our interest in letters

or serious discussion as to be content to reduce our treatment of sex to the standard of
a child's library in the supposed interest of
a salacious few, or that shame will for long
prevent us from adequate portrayal of some
of the most serious and beautiful sides of

human nature.'
Minor skirmishes had been waged by some
fessional Unmasked," a pamphlet published by
the Protestant Electoral Union to further its program of advancing Protestantism and opposing
Catholicism.
' Id. at 371.
1 Ibid.

"See, e.g., People v. Muller, 96 N.Y. 408 (1884);
United States v. Bennett, 24 Fed. Cas. 1093, No.
14,571 (S.D.N.Y. 1879).
'United States v. Kennerley, 209 Fed. 119, 121
(S.D.N.Y. 1913).
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New York tribunals a few years earlier but
the din of battle was barely heard, for the
courts had quietly ignored the Hicklin
standard. 24 It was Judge Hand's opinion
that brought the fray into the open.
The major volley came in the famous
Ulysses decision 5 in which Judge Augustus Hand (with his cousin Learned Hand
concurring, and another judge dissenting)
repudiated the "partly obscene" test 26 estab"In one case, New York's highest court held that
a violent newspaper attack on'the confessional was
not indecent. People v. Eastman, 188 N.Y. 478,
81 N.E. 459 (1907) (per curiam).
5United States v. One Book Entitled Ulysses,
72 F. 2d 705 (2d Cir. 1934), affirming 5 F. Supp.
182 (S.D.N.Y. 1933).
21 Under this test, a book could be banned without
regard to the overall merit of the work if individual
passages were deemed to be obscene. The Ulysses
case established the "dominant effect" test, an approach by which the questioned book is judged as
a whole before it is determined whether its circulation would be morally detrimental to the reader.
The transitions of the Massachusetts "obscenity"
statute are relevant in this regard. Before 1930, it
applied to a book "containing obscene, indecent,
or impure language, or manifestly tending to corrupt the morals of youth" (emphasis added).
MASS. GEN. LAWS 1921, c.272, § 28. In 1930, it
was amended to apply to a book "which is obscene, indecent or impure, or manifestly tends to
corrupt the morals of youth" (emphasis added).
MASS. ANN. LAWS c.272, § 28 (1956). The change
was undoubtedly made to correct such cases as
Commonwealth v. Friede, 271 Mass. 318, 171
N.E. 472 (1930), in which Theodore Dreiser's
"An American Tragedy" was held to be obscene
on the basis of selected passages alone. Massachusetts courts have followed the Ulysses case apart
from its implications that a book is not obscene if
artistry and sincerity of purpose are more predominant than obscenity. See Commonwealth v.
Isenstadt, 318 Mass. 543, 62 N.E. 2d 840 (1945).
It is perhaps significant along this line that in the
Butler case, appellant's counsel argued that there
is a question of whether the word "containing"
made the Michigan statute unconstitutional in view
of prior rulings that books must be judged as a
whole. The Court, however, did not consider this
point in the opinion. 25 U.S.L. WEEK 3117 (U.S.
Oct. 23, 1956).
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lished by the Hicklin case, and also adopted
as the standard for determining a book's
influence the lower court's l'homme moyen
sensuel -

a person with average sex instincts
who plays, in this branch of legal inquiry,
the same role of hypothetical reagent as does
the "reasonable man" in the law of torts.
• 27

While most courts followed the Ulysses
verdict, 28 the war had not yet been won the Hicklin rule still appeared occasionally
in various camouflages. 2 9 Even the United
States Supreme Court recognized "the importance of the exercise of a state's police
power to minimize all incentives to crime,
particularly in the field of sanguinary or salacious publications with their stimulations of
juvenile delinquency. "' 30 It is not unlikely
that the supreme court of the land in the
Doubleday case 3' discussed this question,
for in the trial court a dissenting judge contended that his two colleagues should have
used the average adult as the yardstick, not
32
the young and emotionally*immature.
275 F. Supp. 182, 184 (S.D.N.Y. 1933).
21See,

e.g., People v. Gotham Book Mart, 158
Misc. 240, 285 N.Y. Supp. 563 (N.Y. City Magis.
Ct. 1936); Parmelee v. United States, 113 F. 2d
729 (D.C. Cir. 1940); Bantam Books, Inc. v.
Malko, 25 N.J. Super. 292, 96 A. 2d 47 (1953).

See, e.g., Burstein v. United States, 178 F. 2d
665 (9th Cir. 1949); King v. Commonwealth, 313
Ky. 741, 233 S.W. 2d 522 (1950); Commonwealth
v. New, 142 Pa. Super. 358, 16 A. 2d 437 (1940).
' Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 510 (1948).
"1Doubleday & Co. v. New York, 335 U.S. 848
(1948), affirming per curiam by an equally divided

court sub. nom. People v. Doubleday & Co., 297
N.Y. 687, 77 N.E. 2d 6, affirming mem., 272 App.
Div. 799, 71 N.Y.S. 2d 736 (1st Dep't 1947) (per
curiam). Justice Frankfurter, who wrote the Butler
opinion, did not participate in this case.
' N.Y. Times, Nov. 28, 1946, p. 1, col. 7.

In 1954, the Hicklin rule suffered a devastating setback in its native land, for in
that year England herself abandoned her
prodigy with Regina v. Martin Secker &
Warburg, Ltd. 33 In that case, the court
solemnly declared:
Are we to take our literary standards as
beings the level of something that is suitable
for a fourteen-year-old girl? Or do we go
even further back than that, and are we to
be reduced to the sort of books that one
reads as a child in the nursery? The answer
to that is: Of course not. A mass of literature, great literature, from many angles is
wholly unsuitable for reading by the adoles-

cent, but that does not mean that the publisher is guilty of a criminal offense for

making those words available to the general
public.'
The court established the standard of
"the average, decent, well-meaning man or
35
woman."
With the Butler decision, the war against
the Hicklin rule appears to be over. Without mincing any words, Justice Frankfurter
said that the effect of the Michigan statute
by "quarantining the general reading public
against books not too rugged for grown
men and women in order to shield juvenile
innocence" 36 is to "burn the house to roast
the pig."137 The Court, however, took notice
[1954] 1 Weekly L.R. 1138.
I'1d.at 1139-40.
'Supra note 33, at 1141. The "partly obscene"
test, however, has been expressly reaffirmed in
England in Regina v. Reiter, [1954] 2 Weekly
L.R. 638.
-352 U.S. 380, 383 (1957).
Ibid. Using this same analogy, a New Jersey
newspaper asked editorially: "Why is it arson to
burn down a house 'to roast a pig' and not some
form of arson to burn up the souls of weak grownups with the bonfires of obscenity and destroy
youth bound to get hold of such filth?" Elizabeth

3
that the book, which might possibly have
had a deleterious influence on the young,
was in fact sold to a police officer, and
pointed out that Michigan had an appropriate remedy had the publication actually
3s
been sold to a minor.
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Daily Journal, Feb. 27, 1957, p. 8, col. 1-2. On the
other hand, some publications may reprint what
was written more than a decade ago: "We have
managed to keep at bay the literary censors and
the keyhole peepers who insist that books shall not
be printed that their little Lucy should not read."
Saturday Review of Literature, Mar. 23, 1946,
p. 22.

Though the decision is limited, of course,
to the particular facts of the case, the Court
clearly indicated its approyal of testing the
obscenity of a book by its influence upon
the normal adult. Whether such a standard
must be employed in all instances, however,
is open to question. It would seem that a
state would not be "burning the house to
roast the pig" if it could show that its
"obscenity" statute was reasonably restricted to the evil to be averted and, consequently, was not violative of due process
as protected by the First Amendment.

A Michigan statute makes it a criminal offense
to "sell, give away or in any way furnish to any
minor child any book ...tending to the corruption
of the morals of youth .... MICH. PEN. CODE
§ 142. Another law prohibits exhibiting upon any
public street, or any other place within the view
of children passing on a public street, a book "con-

taining obscene language . . .tending to the corruption of the morals of youth . . ." MICH. PEN.
CODE § 143. Some other states make it a crime to
introduce into any family, school, or place of
education a book containing obscene language.
See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 11190 .(Williams
1934); Wis. STAT. § 351.38 (1951).

